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LAWYER'S LAWYER: THE LIFE OF JoHN W. DAVIS. By William H. 
Harbaugh. New York: Oxford University Press. 1973. Pp. x, 648. 
$15. ' 
In part because of suspicions aroused by the Watergate affair, 
lawyers today find themselves increasingly on the defensive in the 
court of public opinion.1 This negative public attitude has been fed 
by a spate of recent books characterizing attorneys as robber barons 
and influence peddlers.2 While the unpopularity of the bar has been 
a recurrent theme in American legal history,3 the present climate 
suggests a need for re-examining the attorney's role in twentieth 
century American society. 
An excellent source for such a study is the fine biography of 
John W. Davis by Professor William H. Harbaugh of the University 
1. See, e.g., America's Lawyers: A Sick Profession?, U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REl'oRr, 
March 25, 1974, at 23; New York Times, May 29, 1974, § l, at 1, col. 2 (city ed.). 
2. See M. BLOOM, THE TROUBLE WITH LAWYERS (1968); J. GoULDEN, THE SUI'ER-
LAWYERS (1972); E. SMIGEL, THE WAIL STREET LAWYER: PROFESSIONAL ORGANIZATION 
MAN? (1964). 
3. See L. FRIEDMAN, A HlsToRY OF AMERICAN LA-iv (1973). Friedman observes that 
the lawyer "has played a useful role, sometimes admired, but rarely loved." Id. at 266. 
An early reflection of public hostility toward lawyers is this warning by a resident 
of post-Revolutionary Charleston against electing attorneys in a municipal canvass: 
"Shun all lawyers, as they are more liable to corruption than other men; they being 
used to argue for Wrong, as well as Right, when paid for so doing." Charleston 
Evening Gazette, Aug. 25, 1786, at 3, coL 1. 
1496 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 72 
of Virginia. The author has produced a readable account that skill-
fully probes Davis's long career as a talented lawyer. Sensitive to the 
interplay between the legal profession and the rest of American 
society, Harbaugh considers the private practice and public service 
of Davis in a broad context. 
Born in West Virginia, Davis received his undergraduate and 
legal education at Washington and Lee University. He began prac-
ticing law with his father in Clarksburg, where he lost his first three 
trials ( one of which involved the theft of twenty-nine chickens and a 
turkey hen). A decade and a half of small tmvn practice left an im-
print on Davis that was never fully erased by his many years on Wall 
Street. He enjoyed a varied practice, representing individuals and 
criminal defendants as well as corporations.4 
After ten years in public life, Davis joined the Wall Street firm 
of Stetson, Jennings & Russel in 1921, a decision prompted in 
large measure by a desire to attain financial security and thus in-
dulge a love of comfort and elegance. With clients including the 
House of Morgan and some of the largest corporations in the nation, 
Davis came to represent concentrated private economic power. This 
experience reinforced his ingrained economic conservatism and ab-
horrence of federal regulatory power. 
For several decades before his death in 1955, Davis was widely 
recognized as the foremost advocate in the United States and the 
leader of the appellate bar. His success as an advocate was something 
of an anomaly. While the most famous pre-Civil War lawyers, such 
as William Wirt and Daniel Webster, regularly argued in court,11 
the best lawyers grew increasingly estranged from the courtroom 
during the late nineteenth century. The corporation lawyer who 
rarely left his office emerged at the apex of the profession. 6 Davis 
never succumbed entirely to this new order: Benveen 1913 and 1954 
he argued 140 cases before the Supreme Court, and appeared regu-
larly before the federal circuit courts and the state appellate bench. 
Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., William Howard Taft, and Hugo 
Black rated him one of the most persuasive advocates they had ever 
heard. Yet, the qualities that marked the Davis style remain elusive. 
Aside from his careful preparation, Davis's appellate technique is 
difficult to recapture because so much of his power rested upon per-
sonal force. Precise choice of words and a full presentation of the 
4. For example, in 1897 Davis defended union members charged with contempt 
for violating an injunction. 
5. M. BAXTER, DANIEL WEBSTER AND THE SUPREME COURT 17-35 (1966). 
6. In 1925 Judge Learned Hand lamented that in New York City "the best minds 
of the profession are scarcely lawyers at all. They may be something much better, 
or much worse; but they are not that, With courts they have no dealings whatever, 
and would hardly know what to do if they came there." Lundberg, The Law Factories: 
Brains of the Status Quo, HARPER'S MAGAZINE, July 1939, at 179, 189. 
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facts were his hallmarks. He eschewed multiple citations, both in 
argument and in supporting briefs. Following his own advice to "go 
for the jugular vein," Davis normally argued only the major points 
of his position, but argued them so strongly that the minor points 
were swept along unspoken.7 
Davis always asserted that he kept his practice separate from his 
personal views, and he resented the suggestion that "a lawyer sells 
himself body 8c soul to his clients" (p. 199). In 1924, under pressure 
from political friends to improve his image for the forthcoming 
presidential election, Davis penned an eloquent defense of his pro-
fessional integrity: 
At no time have I confined my services to a single client, and in 
consequence I have been called upon to serve a great many different 
kinds of men; some of them good, some of them indifferently good, 
and others over whose character we will drop the veil of charity .... 
Since the law, however, is a profession and not a trade, I conceive it 
to be the duty of the lawyer ... to serve those who call on him unless, 
indeed, there is some insuperable obstacle in the way. 
No one in all this list of clients has ever controlled or even fancied 
that he could control my personal or my political conscience . . . • 
The only limitation upon a right-thinking Ia-wyer's independence is 
the duty which he owes to his clients, once selected, to serve them 
·without the slightest thought of the effect such a service may have 
upon his personal popularity or this political fortunes. [P. 198-99.]8 
Davis's actions supported this declaration of independence. To 
the dismay of conservatives, he defended Alger Hiss and Doctor 
J. Robert Oppenheimer amid the Cold War tensions of the early 
1950's. Despite the clamor of liberals, Davis represented South Caro-
lina in arguing for racial segregation in the public schools. He also 
engaged in pro bono work, appearing on behalf of Doctor Clyde 
Macintosh, a selective conscientious objector, and defending a fellow 
lawyer, Isador J. Kresel, against criminal charges. To his credit, 
Davis was supremely indifferent to the tides of public opinion and 
cared little about the popular standing of his clients. 
Nevertheless, Harbaugh rightly contends that the problem of 
professional independence is more subtle and difficult than Davis 
recognized. The author argues that "to accept a regular retainer 
was to change the character of one's practice and to restrict one's 
political and professional independence" (p. 200), and he relies heavily 
upon the observations of Felix Frankfurter in contending that 
7. See Davis, The Argument of an Appeal, 26 A.B.A.J. 895, 897 (1940) (Address 
delivered before the Association of the Bar of the City of New York, October 22, 1940). 
8. William M. Kunstler selected a portion of Davis's long letter as the frontispiece 
for his book, THE CAsE FOR COURAGE (1962), a chronicle of ten cases in which attorneys 
defended unpopular clients. 
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Davis's associations altered his perceptions of public events. Har-
baugh notes that Davis could not criticize his clients' economic and 
legal activities, even when he privately disapproved of them. What 
seems particularly bothersome to the biographer was Davis's ad-
herence "to the principle that the lawyer's duty was to represent 
his client's interest to the limit of the law, not to moralize on the 
social and economic implications of the client's lawful actions" (p. 
264). 
Unquestionably, Davis's decision to represent a certain class of 
clients curtailed his freedom of action. But, as Harbaugh points out, 
Davis leaned toward economic conservatism long before he came to 
Wall Street. Furthermore, the intellectual problems posed for law-
yers who defend an identifiable interest group or category of client 
are hardly restricted to the corporate firm. The public interest 
lawyer,9 the criminal defense attorney, and counsel for the New 
Left10 suffer from similarly contracted legal horizons. Judging from 
his array of clients and controversial cases, Davis in fact preserved 
more of his freedom than most lawyers.11 However, Harbaugh 
clearly believes that his subject should have demonstrated a more 
liberal and socially activist stance, and this leads him to erect a 
somewhat unrealistic standard by which to measure Davis. 
Since the colonial period lawyers have played an important role 
in public affairs. Davis proved no exception, serving as congressman, 
solicitor general, and ambassador to Great Britain. He received 
the Democratic nomination for president in 1924, only to be soundly 
defeated by Calvin Coolidge. Appalled by the anti-Catholic cam-
paign conducted against Alfred E. Smith in 1928, Davis toured the 
country calling for religious toleration. During his political sallies 
Davis championed the values of the pre-New Deal Democratic 
party: states' rights and economy in government. 
Yet, Davis did not especially enjoy politics, despite his numerous 
activities. Very much a private person, he was ever the reluctant 
candidate, pushed by friends and a sense of duty to accept official 
position. His love of advocacy and his enjoyment of a large income 
even caused Davis to reject an appointment to the United States 
Supreme Court.12 
9. Ralph Nader's "raiders,''. for example, have been accused of an anti-business 
bias. See R. BUCKHORN, NADER: THE PEOPLE'S LAWYER 89 (1972), See generally C. 
McCARRY, CITIZEN NADER (1972). 
IO. William Kunstler has declared: "I only defend those whose goals I share •• , • 
I only defend those I love." J. BISHOP, OBITER DicrA 6 (1971). 
11. "Although the New Bar is very critical of the Wall Street lawyers' subservient 
reflection of their clients' political views, the charge is far more applicable to them-
selves. The Wall Street lawyer, in fact, is likely to shape the policies of his clients, 
which is certainly not true of counsel to the New Left." Id. at 15. 
12. Davis in 1922 disclaimed Chief Justice Taft's move to have him named to the 
high bench. He never regretted the decision. 
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While in Congress Davis played a key role in the 1912 impeach-
ment of Circuit Judge Robert W. Archbald.18 After the judge was 
impeached for using his position to advance his economic interests, 
Davis was named one of the House managers of the prosecution. 
He took only a limited part in the prosecution, preparing an analysis 
of the grounds for judicial _impeachment in which he concluded that 
"high crimes and misdemeanors" encompassed offenses not neces-
sarily indictable as crimes. "No man can justly be considered fit 
for public office," Davis asserted, "who does not realize the double 
duty resting upon him-first, to administer his trust with unflinching 
honesty, &, second ... to so conduct himself that public confidence 
in his honesty shall remain unshaken" (p. 85). 
As solicitor general, Davis never allowed his personal views to 
interfere with his advocacy of the government's position. He felt 
that policy questions were not an appropriate concern of the solici-
tor general, and thus dutifully defended the Adamson Act,14 the 
Child Labor Statute,15 and other Wilson administration measures 
that expanded federal power. Although he questioned the wisdom 
of Negro suffrage, Davis argued against the Oklahoma grandfather 
clause16 and the Alabama peonage practice.17 
Harbaugh wisely does not attempt to describe all of Davis's 
cases, concentrating instead upon such significant contests as the 
1952 steel seizure case,18 which Harbaugh sees as "the summit" of 
Davis's career (p. 462). Here Davis's distrust of federal power and 
his respect for private property flowed together into a powerful 
attack upon the doctrine of implied executive powers. He regarded 
Truman's action as "a reassertion of the kingly prerogative, the 
struggle against which illumines all the pages of Anglo-Saxon his-
tory" (p. 462), and was elated at his part in blocking the president.19 
This concern for limited government, together with his acceptance 
of the white social order, induced Davis to present his last Supreme 
Court argument on behalf of school segregation. The subsequent 
Brown decision20 upset Davis, who was confident that history and 
precedent were ovenvhelmingly on his side. 
13. For a brief discussion of the Archbald impeachment see R. BERGER, IMPEACH-
MENT: THE CONsrITUTIONAL PROBLEMS 57-58 n.15 (1973). 
14. Wilson v. New, 243 U.S. 332 (1917). 
15. Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918). 
16. Guinn v. United States, 238 U.S. 347 (1915). 
17. United States v. Reynolds, 235 U.S. 133 (1914). 
18. Youngstown Sheet&: Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952). 
19. Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr. has recently argued that, while "the idea of inde-
pendent presidential power received a severe rebuke" in the steel seizure case, the 
Supreme Court "by no means excluded presidential initiative in authentic and in-
disputable crisis." A. SCHLESINGER, THE !Ml'ERIAL PRESIDENCY 143, 148 (1973). 
20. Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
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Harbaugh's book is carefully researched and based in part upon 
the private papers of his subject. His liberal predilections contrast 
with Davis's conservatism to produce generally exciting intellectual 
tension. On some occasions, however, Harbaugh's attitude emerges 
too sharply. For example, he is clearly impatient with Davis's par-
ticipation in the Lmvyers' Vigilance Committee of the American 
Liberty League, an anti-New Deal group whose purpose was to 
issue reports on the constitutionality of New Deal measures. Har-
baugh even questions the ethical propriety of attorneys expressing 
such opinions, yet he never makes clear how the activities of the 
La,vyers' Committee differed from those of various civil rights or-
ganizations. Similarly; in the chapter on the steel seizure, Harbaugh's 
extended and sympathetic treatment of the grievances of the em-
ployees-a matter of marginal relevance to the legal issues raised-
grows a bit cloying. Still more troublesome, especially in the Water-
gate era, is the author's apparent endorsement of the doctrine of 
inherent executive power, a concept at variance with the very no-
tion of limited government.21 
Toward the end of his life Davis contended that his achievements 
were quite small. "I seem," he wrote, "to have caught" at the skirt 
of great events ·without really influencing them" (p. 523). The au-
thor adopts this assessment of Davis's career, and thus one is left 
to question the contribution of any practicing attorney to American 
society. If John W. Davis had little impact, how significant can be 
the activities of most of us? It is a sobering thought. 
James W. Ely, Jr. 
Assistant Professor of Law 
Vanderbilt University 
21. Cf. United States v. Nixon, 42 u.s.L.W. 5237 (U.S. July 24, 1974); United States 
v. United States Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297 (1972); Nixon v. Sirica, 487 F.2d 700 (D.C. 
Cir. 1973). 
